A Readily Available Alternative to Wearable Tech
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In 2009, the introduction of the Fitbit tracker began a global obsession with continuous biometric data monitoring. Fitness tech like GPS running watches and heart rate monitors were already on the market, but the Fitbit started a wildfire as its release coincided with social media making its way into smartphones. Though the craze began with a basic step count monitor, the field has breached other proxies of health and wellness such as heart rate variability for stress, nine-axis inertial measurement units for movement, proprietary algorithms for sleep, etc. It seemed like Americans were desperate to get their hands on the latest tracker, regardless of what it tracked.
Unsurprisingly, in a community where fitness is highly valued, the military joined to the hype. By 2013, the Army had already outfitted three battalions of Soldiers with Fitbits as part of the Performance Triad pilot program. Even recently, the University of North Georgia outfitted their freshmen class of cadets with Whoop straps for a similar pilot study. Most Soldiers have also procured wearable devices of their own volition. It’s really not a question of if you will find Garmin watches, Oura rings, and Whoop straps in any random formation, but how many. Recently, the Department of War even named wearable tech and data analytics as top priorities for warfighter performance optimization. In response, units are itching to outfit their Soldiers with the latest tech to begin collecting data immediately.
Individual Wearable Tech
Individuals buy fitness trackers for two main categories of reasons: acute and continuous monitoring. Acute monitoring primarily refers to tracking training sessions (heart rate, distance, calories expended, etc.), and perhaps stringing those data together over time to monitor fatigue and recovery through some proprietary mechanism, or to post on Strava. Continuous monitoring is used for collecting data all day and/or night (heart rate variability, steps, skin temperature, etc.), and perhaps using these data to inform behavior change, or to post on Instagram. I say “perhaps” for both of these, because if the tracker is purchased for a specific purpose (inform training decisions, encourage behavior change, etc.), then the devices can easily justify their worth. Data without intent, however, are useless. If the purchase of the device precedes the purpose, it will not justify its worth.
For individuals, I argue that if you don’t have a specific outcome in mind for the tech you want to buy, then any money spent is wasted. Your new $300 watch plus subscription is effectively the 2026 equivalent of an unused Planet Fitness membership; you feel more fit, but are you really? Otherwise, once you have an outcome in mind, the goal of wearable tech is to get rid of wearable tech. Identify the problem you want to solve, solve it, then get rid of the device. Use the sleep tracker to give yourself active feedback on how training, a night of drinking, or doomscrolling affects your sleep, ruthlessly correct the behavior, then put the device away. Use a heart rate strap to feel what your zone 2 and zone 5 physically feel like, then put the device away. Let the device empower you, then remove it before it becomes the source of your strength.
Organizational Wearable Tech
Organizationally, unit commanders want to make informed decisions, and military leaders see wearable fitness trackers as a mechanism to make informed, data-driven decisions. One specific example is the desire to use biometric trackers to enable commanders to monitor the vitals of their geographically dispersed Soldiers in real time (which is a novel concept and in no way originated from the 1986 masterpiece Aliens). While their suitability may vary by operational environment, the concept has been tested in a large-scale exercise, and was validated in protected training environments like the Best Ranger Competition where a tracker enabled the early detection of rhabdomyolysis in one ranger. Another example was the validation of heart rate variability and sleep data as a potential means to determine how many additional training reps that units at gunnery could sustain before they became counterproductive. That last one may ultimately fail the juice-vs-squeeze test, but the concept is certainly compelling.
Before we start purchasing units at scale, we must stop and address some preliminary questions. What specific purpose will these devices serve? What specific data or metric are we trying to collect? What specific problem are we trying to solve with these data? Specifically, how will we alter our approach based on the data collected?
If we fail to answer these questions we risk wasting taxpayer dollars, unnecessarily burdening Soldiers with another requirement, and damaging a key part of our culture. The wearable tech component of the 2013 Performance Triad study resulted in failure, even reporting that the “hard-chargers ‘regressed to the mean.’” They assumed incorrectly that mere proximity to faddish wearable tech would increase activity and fitness levels. Their solution? Do it again, but with five brigades of Soldiers and an increased emphasis on leadership to make the program successful. The UNG Whoop pilot program similarly yielded minimal benefits that failed to outweigh the cost. Their solution? Do it again, but with more cadets and an increased emphasis on leadership to make the program successful.
A Better Approach
What if we stopped forcing programs to be successful for their own sake and instead emphasized leadership to solve the original problem: Soldier readiness?
Organizationally, save a few very niche applications, I would argue that the Army already has something even better than wearable tech that can enable commanders to make informed decisions using real-time feedback. They’re called Non-Commissioned Officers; the backbone of the Army. There are few things that a wearable device can tell you about a Soldier that their squad leader didn’t already know. A sleep tracker will tell you that PFC Smith’s HRV is degraded, but their squad leader can explain that they’ve been having marital trouble for weeks. A heart rate strap will tell you that SPC Jones isn’t keeping pace with the platoon on rucks, but their team leader can tell you whether they have low conditioning, have had recent injuries, are having an off week, or suffer from THS. A poor recovery score can indicate low readiness, but a platoon sergeant understands the platoon’s training history, functional baseline, and current morale. Wearable sensors collect data, but NCOs are armed with context and experience that can drive real change.
The cultural cost of reliance on wearable tech is one the Army can’t afford to pay. Muscles that aren’t regularly flexed begin to atrophy. If we continue to replace NCO intuition with technology, the muscles that support the backbone of the Army will continue to atrophy. If anything, technology should be used to augment leadership, rather than replace it. Before issuing devices across a formation, commanders should identify the problem, define the decision the data will inform, determine who will interpret the data, and explain how the information will improve Soldier readiness. Otherwise, this may be one of the rare times when no decision may be the appropriate decision.
An Army that leans on the experience and capabilities of the NCO Corps will always be more fit, ready, and lethal than an Army that leans on Fitbits.
Bushatz, A. (2013). Army issues Fitbit bands in test fitness program. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/10/22/army-issues-fitbit-bands-in-test-fitness-program.html
Kirk, B. (2026). Scaling wearable technology to advance readiness. H2F Symposium Breakout Session.
Department of War. (2026). Warfighter Performance Optimization – Total Force Fitness.
Seck, H. H. (2026). Wearable patches could monitor troops’ health, sense danger. National Defense Industrial Association. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2026/2/27/wearable-patches-could-monitor-troops-health-sense-danger
Bate, J., Hightower, S., & Rough, R. (2026). Make units more combat ready? Yes, and this brigade gunnery exercise showed how. Modern War Institute. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/can-biometric-data-make-units-more-combat-ready-yes-and-this-brigade-gunnery-exercise-showed-how/
Lilley, K. (2015). 20,000 soldiers tapped for Army fitness program’s 2nd trial. Army Times. https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2015/07/27/20000-soldiers-tapped-for-army-fitness-program-s-2nd-trial/
Johnny Bates is currently serving as an active-duty Army EOD Officer. Outside of work, he is a husband, father, coffee connoisseur, and smoked meat enthusiast.